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NOTES 
A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
"WRONGFUL LIFE" IN 
CALIFORNIA: BREECH 
BIRTH OR 
ABORTION? 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Medical advances during the last fifteen years in the fields 
of genetic testing and prenatal diagnosis of fetal defects have 
created a new plaintiff. This plaintiff's cause of action, termed 
"wrongful life," alleges that the defendant's negligence caused 
her l birth and thereby made manifest the pain and suffering of 
her genetic defects. 
Most American courts have denied the infant plaintiff ac-
cess to the courts by holding that she has not suffered any injury 
assessable under Aniericantort law. Within the California Court 
of Appeal, two districts have recently arrived at opposite conclu-
sions, and the issue is being reviewed by the California Supreme 
Court.1 In Curlencler v. Bio-Science Laboratories' the California 
Court of Appeal for the Second District reviewed and rejected 
arguments advanced in major cases from other jurisdictions 
which refuse to recognize plaintiff's purported cause of action. 
Holding that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action, 
Curlender developed a new theory of recovery. One year later, 
1. The plaintiffs in the two major wrongful life cases reviewed in this Note hap-
pened to be female. as are the majority of plaintiffs mentioned herein. Therefore, the 
feminine gender will be used when referring generally to a wrongful life plaintiff. How-
ever. in this context. the feminine includes the masculine. 
2. Turpin v. Bortini. 119 Cal. App. 3d 690.174 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1981), rev'd (May 3, 
1982) (No. S.F. 24319). See editor's note at the end of this Note. 
3. 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (2nd Dist. 1980). 
423 
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the California Court of Appeal for the fifth District decided Tur-
pin u. Sortini, 4 rejecting the Curlender analysis and refusing to 
recognize the plaintiff's cause of action for wrongful life. 
In so doing, the Turpin majority failed to recognize the im-
port of the Curlender decision, dismissed its reasoning as "nar-
row, humanistic,"!! "without analysis,'" "unsound,'" "unwise'" 
and "conclusional,"9 and thereby failed to address and explain 
its conclusion that Curlender's ground breaking holding, unique 
reasoning, and policy bases were unjustified and unworkable 
within modern tort law. 
After tracing the history of the major wrongful life cases in 
this country, this Note will assess the conflict between Turpin 
and Curlender and show why Curlender's unique reasoing con-
forms to modern tort law and compels recognition of a child's 
cause of action for wrongful life. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. OVERVIEW 
Zepeda u. Zepeda lo was the first wrongful life case in this 
country. Joseph Zepeda, born an illegitimate child, brought suit 
against his father, Louis Zepeda. l1 The court found that the 
plaintiff's complaint contained all the elements of a willful tortll 
and it also stated that an illegitimate child suffers an injury, but 
it refused to allow the plaintiff's cause of action. II The court said 
that the plaintiff protested his very birth and .thus called this 
new tort "wrongful life. III. The court believed that under this 
4. 119 Cal. App. 3d 690, 174 Cal. Rptr. 128 (6th Dist. 1981), rev'd (May 3, 1982) (No. 
S.F. 24319). 
6. rd. at 697, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 132. 
6. ld. at 695, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 131. 
7. ld. at 692, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 129. 
8. ld. at 697, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 132. 
9. ld. at 695, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 131. 
10. 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963). 
11. In Zepeda, the plaintiff alleged that his illegitimate status was due to his fa-
ther's actions in inducing his mother to engage in sexual relations. The inducement was a 
promise of marriage. However, the defendant was already married and, though the plain-
tiff was conceived and born, the promise was not kept. ld. at 245, 190 N.E.2d at 851. 
12. ld. at 259, 190 N.E.2d at 858. 
13. [d. at 258, 190 N.E.2d at 857. 
14. ld. at 259, 190 N.E.2d at 858. 
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new theory of wrongful life, any unliked physical characteristic, 
including a hereditary disease, would be actionable.II The main 
concern of the court was not the flood of litigation that might 
result from suits by illegitimates, but rather the multifarious cir-
cumstances and physical characteristics that might constitute an 
injury and therefore be actionable under a wrongful life theory.11 
If this new cause of action was to be accepted, the court thought 
that it should be declared by the legislature. I ' 
In Williams v. State,18 the New York Court of Appeals also 
faced a plaintiff who claimed injury due to her illegitimacy. The 
suit was brought not against her father, however, but against the 
state mental institution where her mother had been confined. It 
The Williams' court could find no basis for ruling that an illegit-
imate child has suffered an injury recognized by law. tO Focusing 
on the circumstantial nature of the claimed injury, the court 
stated that, "being bom under one set of circumstances rather 
than another or to one pair of parents rather than another is not 
a suable wrong that is cognizable in court. "II 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Keating expressed what, for 
later courts, would become the main impediment to recognition 
of a wrongful life cause of·action: 
Damages are awarded in tort cases on the basis of 
a comparison between the position the plaintiff 
would have been in, had the defendant not com-
mitted the acts causing injury, and the position in 
which the plaintift' presently finds herself. The 
damages sought by the plaintiff in the case at bar 
involve a determination as to whether non-exis-
tence or nonlife is preferable to life as an illegiti-
15. Id. at 260, 190 N.E.2d at 858. 
16.1d. 
17. Id. at 263, 190 N.E.2d at 859. 
18. 18 N.Y.2d 481, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966). 
19. Plaintiff Christine Williams was conceived when her mother was raped by an 
unidentified assailant while she was confined as a patient in a New York mental facility. 
The child alleged that the state was negligent in its care, custody and supervision of her 
mother and in failing to protect her from physical attacks. The plaintiff claimed injuries 
from illegitimacy and deprivation of a normal childhood, including deprivation of proper 
care, support and rearing because her mother was mentally deficient. The court, how-
ever, addressed illegitimacy as the main injury. Id. at 482, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 886. 
20.1d. 
21. Id. at 484, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 887. 
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mate with all the hardship attendant thereon. It 
is impossible to make that choice. II 
Both the belief that the child's cause of action required a 
valuation of nonexistence against life and a judicial reluctance to 
make or even allow to be made such a determination recur in all 
the later cases, except Curlender. 
In Gleitman v. Cosgrovea8 the New Jersey Supreme Court 
became the first court to address a wrongful life suit where the 
injuries were birth defects with pain and suffering and the negli-
gence alleged was medical malpractice. l • Sandra Gleitman en-
tered the care of defendant Dr. Cosgrove when she was two 
months pregnant. A month earlier she had had German measles. 
Mrs. Gleitman testified that Dr. Cosgrove advised her that the 
measles would have no effect on her child. Allegedly, this opin-
ion was repeated to Ms. Gleitman at a later date by the other 
defendant, also a doctor. III Subsequently, she gave birth to a 
baby boy, plaintiff Jeffrey Gleitman, born deaf, mute, almost 
blind and mentally retarded. Ie The parents alleged that had 
they been informed of the possibility of the defective birth, Mrs. 
Gleitman would have undergone an abortion." 
The court stated that in tort law, compensatory damages 
are measured by the difference between the plaintiff's impaired 
state and the state the plaintiff would have been in absent the 
defendant's negligence.lIS Here, the infant plaintiff never would 
have existed since, absent the negligence, the parents would 
have aborted the fetus.le 
22. Id. at 484-85, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 888 (emphasis added). 
23. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967). 
24. Besides the child plaintift"saction for wrongful life, his parents brought "wrong-
ful birth" actions on their own behalf for the injuries to themselves arising from the 
birth and life of their son. Id. at 23, 227 A.2d at 690. 
25. Id. at 24, 227 A.2d at 690. 
26. Id. at 29, 227 A.2d at 703. 
27. Id. at 26, 227 A.2d at 691. In rebuttal, Dr. Cosgrove testified that he did inform 
Mrs. Gleitman of the possible effects of her measles on the fetus. Id. at 25, 227 A.2d at 
690. The parents sought damages for their own mental and emotional suffering and for 
the expense of raising the child; the child sought to recover for his own pain and suffer-
ing due to the birth defects. Id. at 24, 227 A.2d at 690. 
28. Id. at 28, 227 A.2d at 692. The court stated, "the infant plaintiff would have us 
measure the difference between his life with defects against the utter void of nonexis-
tence, but it is impossible to make such a determination." Id. 
29. "[Tlhe conduct complained of, even if true, does not give rise to damages cogni-
4
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In the years following Gleitman, other state courts began to 
recognize the parents' cause of action for wrongful birth while at 
the same time continuing to deny the child's wrongful life cause 
of action. so Recognition of the parents' cause of action was some-
times facilitated by the U.S. Supreme Court's abortion decision 
of Roe v. Wade,81 since a woman's constitutional right to an 
abortion during the first trimester supports the parents' right to 
choose to abort a genetically defective fetus. Abortion is not al-
zable at law." Id. at 29, 227 A.2d at 692. In also denying the parent's cause of action, the 
court found that it was impossible to weigh the benefit of the child against the parent's 
emotional and monetary damages. "Such a proposed weighing is similar to what which 
we have found impossible to perform for the infant plaintiff." Id. at 29, 227 A.2d at 693. 
30. See Gidner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978); 
Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Stewart v. Long Island Col" 
lege Hosp., 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968), modified 35 A.D.2d 
531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970), aff'd as modified, 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 
N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 
(1975). For commentaries on the wrongful life subject see Capron, Informed Decision-
making In Genetic Counseling: A Dissent To the "Wrongful Life" Debate, 48 IND. L.J. 
581 (1972-73); Friedman, Legal Implications of Amniocentesis, 123 UNIV. or PA. L. REv. 
92 (1974); Kashi, The Case of The Unwanted Blessing: Wrongful Life, 31 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 1409 (1977); Kelley, Wrongful Life, Wrongful Birth, and Justice in Tort Law, 1979 
WASH. U.L.Q. 919 (1979); Ploscowe, An Action for "Wrongful Life", 38 N.Y.U. L. REv. 
1078 (1963); Robertson, Toward Rational Boundaries of Tort Liability for Injury to the 
Unborn: Prenatal Injuries, Preconception Injuries and Wrongful Life, 1978 DUKE L.J. 
1401; Tedeschi, On Tort Liability for "Wrongful Life", 1 ISRAEL L. REv. 513 (1966); 
Note, Wrongful Life and a Fundamental Right To Be Healthy: Park v. Chessin; Becker 
v. Schwartz, 27 BUFFALO L. REV. 537 (1978); Comment, Wrongful Life and Wrongful 
Birth Causes of Action-Suggestions For a Consistent Analysis, 63 MARQ. L. REv. 611 
(1980); Note, A Cause of Action for "Wrongful Life": A Suggested Analysis, 55 MINN. L. 
REV. 58 (1970); Note, Preconception Tort-The Need for a Limitation, 44 Mo. L. REV. 
143 (1979); Note, Torts- Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life, 44 Mo. L. REV. 167 (1979); 
Note, Torts Prior To Conception: A New Theory of Liability, 56 NEB. L. REV. 706 
(1977); Comment, Howard v. Lecher: An Unreasonable Limitation on a Physician's Lia-
bility in a Wrongful Life Suit, 12 NEW ENG. L. REv. 819 (1977); Comment, Wrongful 
Birth: The Emerging Status of a New Tort, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 140 (1976); Note, 
Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories: Filling The Wrongful Life Vacuum, 9 SAN FER-
NANDO VALLEY L. REv. 113 (1981); Note, New Jersey Recognizes Parents Cause of Ac-
tion for Emotional Damages for Wrongful Birth But Denies Infant's Cause of Action 
for Wrongful Life, 53 TEMPLE L.Q. 176 (1980); Note, Torts- Wrongful Life-Infant's 
Right To Sue For Negligent Genetic Counseling, 48 TENN. L. REV. 493 (1981); Com-
ment, Preconception Torts: A New Look at Our Newest Class of Litigants, 10 TEx. 
TECH. L. REV. 97 (1978); Comment, Liability For Wrongfully Causing One To Be Born: 
Development of a Tort For "Wrongful Life", 10 U.W.L.A. L. REv. 53 (1978); Note, 
Torts-An Action for Wrongful Life Brought on Behalf of the Wrongfully Conceived 
Infant, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 712 (1977); Note, Torts- Wrongful Life-No Cause of 
Action for Failure to Inform Of Possible Birth Defects, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 750 (1967); 
Note Wrongful Life: A Modern Claim which Conforms to the Traditional Tort Frame-
work, 20 WM. & MARY L. REV. 125 (1978). 
31. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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ways an issue in a wrongful life or wrongful birth case, however. 
As later cases reveal, developments in genetic testing provide a 
method of determining the possibility of genetic defects even 
prior to conception.32 Coupled with modern methods of contra-
ception, this affords parents the choice not to conceive a child 
who would face life with severe physical or mental defects. 
In a case of first impression in New York, the appeals court 
in Park v. Chessin38 rejected the arguments from other jurisdic-
tions and took the unprecedented step of recognizing the child's 
cause of action for wrongfullife.84 It found that New York's abo-
lition of its abortion ban gave parents the right not to have a 
child. II Then, without citing authority or providing much analy-
sis, the court stated that, "[T]he breach of this right may also be 
said to be tortious to the fundamental right of a child to be born 
as a whole, functional human being ... ae 
The court held that the infant plaintiff stated a cause of 
action for wrongful life and allowed recovery for the child's inju-
ries and conscious pain and suffering.a7 Though the Park court's 
holding was to be short-lived, it was the initial judicial attempt 
to· provide a framework for recognition of a wrongful life cause 
of action. 
In a companion case, Becker v. Swartz,a. the New York 
Court of Appeals reversed the Park decision, at holding that the 
32. See Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counselins, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 618 
(1979). 
33. 60 A.D.2d 30, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977). 
34. Steven and Hetty Park sued on behalf of themselves and their child, Sara Park. 
Hetty had previously given birth to a child with fatal polycystic kidney disease who sur· 
vived only five hours. Because this disease is hereditary, there was a substantial 
probability that any subsequent child would likewise be afflicted. The parents alleged 
that prior to conceiving a second child they consulted the defendant doctors who alleg· 
edly stated that the disease was not hereditary and the the chances of these parents 
producing another child with the diseases were "practically nil." The parents then con· 
ceived their second child, plaintiff Sara Park, who was also born with polyeystic kidney 
disease and died from it at the age of two·and·a·half. Id. at 83, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 111. 
35. Id. at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114. 
36.Id. 
37. [d. A concurring justice noted that "the action on behalf of the deceased infant 
is not for 'wrongful life', but rather for conscious pain and Buffering allegedly caused by 
the negligence of the defendant doctors." Id. at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 115. 
38. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). 
39. Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 30, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977). 
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child, Sara Park, failed to state a cause of action. The court 
based its holding on two closely related concepts. First, the 
plaintiff had not suffered a legally cognizable injury. Philoso-
phers and theologians, the court reasoned, not judges, are 
equipped to decide "[w)hether it is better never to have been 
born at all than to have been born with even gross deficien-
cies. "40 The court found "no predicate at common law or in stat-
utory enactment for judicial recognition of the birth of a defec-
tive child as an injury to the child."41 Second, assessing 
compensatory damages requires a measurement of nonexistence 
(the. state the child would have been in absent the negligence), 
against life with defects (the state the child is in due to the de-
fendant's negligence). The court found it impossible to make 
this measurement.41 Both these concepts are founded on the 
court's refusal to assess, or allow a jury to assess, the value of 
nonexistence or of life. U In the end, the court decided that legis-
lative, rather than judicial, action was required for recognition of 
this novel cause of action.44 
The theoretical problems that courts have faced in dealing 
with plaintiffs who claim injury due to birth with physical ab-
40. 46 N.Y.2d at 411, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900. 
41. Id. 
42. "Simply put, a cause of action brought on behalf of an infant seeking recovery 
for wrongful life demands a calculation of damages dependant upon a comparison be-
tween the Hobson's choice of life in an impaired state and nonexistence. This compari-
son, the law is not eqoipped to make." Id. at 442, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900. 
43. The court also rejected the appellate court's new found right to be born whole: 
"There is no precedent for recognition at the Appellate Division of 'the fundamental 
right of a child to be born as a whole, functional human being.''' Id. at 411,413 N.Y.S.2d 
at 900 (citations omitted). 
44. Id., at 412, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901. The court then allowed the parents' cause of 
action for wrongful birth, but limited the recoverable damages to the monetary expenses 
of care and treatment until the child's death. Id. at 415, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 903. For policy 
reasons, the court declined to allow damages for the parents' mental and emotional sw-
fering. The court cited REsTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 920 which states: 
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to 
the plaintiff or to his property and in so doing has conferred a 
special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that was harmed, 
the value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation 
of damages to the extent that this is equitable. 
Noting that the parents' damages for mental and emotional suffering would be mitigated 
by the emotional rewards of parenthood, the court found the calculation of these dam-
ages too speculative. The court again deferred allowance of these damages to the legisla-
ture. Id. at 415, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 902. 
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normalities are shown in Elliott v. Brown,'" an Alabama Su-
preme Court case decided four months prior to Becker. The El-
liott case depicts a claim which, unlike Gleitman or Park, aptly 
deserves the label "wrongful life." In Elliott, the husband under-
went a vasectomy because of fears for the wife's health if she 
had to go through a pregnancy. Thereafter, Rachael Elliott was 
conceived and later born with serious deformities.·' 
The infant plaintiff alleged that the vasectomy had been 
performed negligently." The court reviewed earlier cases, in-
cluding Gleitman and Park, and found that the denial of a cause 
of action for wrongful life is based on the impossibility of calcu-
lating damages.48 Raising and disposing of this claim,·' the court 
held there is no legal right to be born as a whole, functional 
human being.lo On these bases the court denied the child's cause 
of action. 
However, Elliott is distinguishable from wrongful life cases 
faced by other courts. In Elliott, the plaintiff did riot allege that 
the "defendant knew or should have known that, if born, she 
would have a deformity."ll Thus, the defendant could not have 
been negligent toward the child plaintiff with respect to her pain 
and suffering from the defects. In Elliott, unlike other wrongful 
life cases reviewed here, the plaintiff truly claimed that the de-
fendant's negligence simply consisted of allowing her to be con-
ceived and born. Even if a wrongful life cause of action were 
recognized, the child plaintiff in Elliott would not be allowed to 
recover damages for the defects, since these were an unforsee-
able consequence of the defendant's negligence. 
In Berman v. Allanll the New Jersey Supreme Court was 
called upon to reassess Gleitman, decided twelve years earlier. 
Sharon, the child plaintiff, sought damages for the physical and 
emotional pain and suffering due to her mongloid condition.ls As 
45. 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. S. Ct. 1978). 
46. Id. at 547. 
47.Id. 
48.Id. 
49. Id. at 548. 
50.Id. 
51. Id. at 547. 
52. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979). 
53. Shirley Berman, 38 years old and pregnant, entered into the care or the deren-
8
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in Gleitman, the Berman court denied the. child's cause of ac-
tion, albeit for a different reason. 
The Berman court acknowledged that Sharon would suffer 
greatly.&4 Comparing her to normal, healthy children, the court 
stated "she, unlike them, will experience a great deal of physical 
and emotional pain and anguish."n Then the court did explicitly 
what prior courts had only done implicitly: it weighed the value 
of life with defects against nonexistence and came down on the 
side of life in any form." 
In Speck v. Finegold'" an intermediate Pennsylvania court 
denied the child's wrongful life cause of action, but allowed the 
parents' cause of action for wrongful birth by relying on the Cal-
ifornia case of Custodio v. Bauer." In denying the child-plaintiff 
dant doctors. She later gave birth to the child plaintiff, Sharon, who was born with 
Down's Syndrome-a genetic defect commonly known as mongolism. The plaintiffs, 
Sharon and her parents, alleged that the defendant doctors failed to follow standard 
medical practice. They alleged that because of Shirley's age and the statistically high 
possibility that a child bom of a woman who is over 35 years old will have Down's Syn· 
drome, the defendants should have informed her about amniocentosis, a method of de· 
tecting genetic defects in a fetus. The plaintiffs further alleged that had they been 110 
informed and if the defects were detected, the fetus would have been aborted. rd. at 424· 
25, 404 A.2d at 10. 
54. Mter cataloging the instances where society shows how precious life is, the court 
noted that society also has a high regard for members of the medical profession. rd. at 
429·30, 404 A.2d at 12·13. 
55. rd. at 430, 404 A.2d at 13. 
56. "Notwithstanding her afBication with Down's Syndrome, Sharon, by virtue of 
her birth, will be able to love and be loved and to experience happiness and pleasure -
emotions which are truly the essence of life and which are far more valuable than the 
Buffering she may endure." rd. Reversing part of Gleitman's holding, the Berman court 
recognized the parents' claim for emotional and mental suffering. The parents' claim for 
actual expenses of raising the child was denied because the court found this burden to be 
more than offset by the benefit they received - the joy and love of raising the child. rd. 
at 432, 404 A.2d at 14. 
57. 408 A.2d 496 (Pa. Super.) (1979). 
58. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967). The court also made an interest· 
ing observation. The trial court had denied the parents' cause of action because the 
worth and sanctity of life was so great a societal interest that allowing damages in any 
form would be against public policy. The appellate court stated that "the lower court 
misses the point when it bases its opinion on this premise. The question is not the worth 
and sanctity of life, but whether the doctors were negligent in their surgical attempts at 
vasectomy and abortion." 408 A.2d at 503. No reason is given in the opinion for why this 
idea did not apply with equal force to the child's cause of action. For this court, as for 
prior courts, the "worth and sanctity of life" was the main consideration for denial of the 
child's cause of action. 
9
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Francine's cause of action,'11 the court enunciated several theo-
ries, all of which had been dealt with by earlier courts. First, 
there is no fundamental right to be born as a whole functional 
human being. The value of nonexistence over that of life with 
defects is a question for philosophers and theologians, not tort 
law.'o Second, in tort law, damages are compensatory; measuring 
damages requires a comparison of non-existence with life in an 
impaired state-a comparison the law cannot make. II Third, this 
was not an action cognizable at law.1t While the court failed to 
explain the third point, it apparently concluded that the child 
has suffered no injury recognized by law because the court can-
not and will not measure damages under traditional tort 
principles. 
B. CALIFORNIA CASE LAW 
Two California cases, decided prior to Curlender, shed light 
on the issues that arise in wrongful life causes and provide con-
ceptual tools for dealing with them. These cases also show the 
state of California law on the subject when Curlender arose. 
'In 1967, just two months after Gleitman refused to recog-
nize either the parents' or child's causes of action, a California 
appellate court in Custodio v. Bauer" recognized the parents' 
cause of action for wrongful birth and allowed a broad range of 
damages. The parents, seeking to limit the size of their family 
and to protect the wife's health, employed the defendant doctors 
to perform a sterilization operation upon the wife. When the 
wife later became pregnant and gave birth to a healthy child, 
59. 408 A.2d at 509. Frank and Dorothy Speck decided they did not want any more 
children. Tbey were concerned that another child would be aftlicted with neurofibro· 
matosis, a crippling and disfiguring disease of the fibrous structures of the nerves. Their 
fear was well founded. Frank and their daughters, Valerie and Lee Ann, were already 
victims of the disease. For this reason, Mr. Speck had Dr. Finegold, one defendant, per· 
form a vasectomy. Thereafter, Mrs. Speck became pregnant. Dr. Swartz, another defen-
dant, was then engaged to perform an abortion, after which he allegedly proclaimed suc-
cessful termination of the pregnancy. About four months later Francine Speck was born 
prematurely and aftlicted with neurofibromatosis. 408 A.2d at 499-500. 
60. 408 A.2d at 508. 
6!. ld. In Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110 (1981) (Pa. Super.), the Supreme Court 
split 3-3 on the question of whether Francine could bring a wrongful life cause of action. 
This evenly divided vote operated to automatically affirm the intermediate court's deter-
mination that Francine did not have a cause of action against the defendant doctors. 
62.ld. 
63. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967). 
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their tenth, the parent plaintiffs alleged that the operation was 
performed negligently. No cause of action was brought by the 
child, presumably because the child was born healthy. 
The Custodio court rejected arguments similar to those 
raised by the defendants in Gleitman and held that the parents 
stated a cause of action. Upon proof of negligence, damages were 
allowable for the cost of the sterilization operation, mental and 
physical pain, loss of the wife's society and comfort, cost of the 
pregancy and delivery, and any further damages developed at 
trial, including the costs of raising the child. If 
The court then addressed the applicability of the benefit 
rule of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 920." The 
Custodio court noted that the rule contemplates a benefit to the 
interest to be protected. ee Thus, when the defendant's negli-
gence confers a benefit as well as a burden on the plantiff, the 
defendant can offset the measure of damages with the value of 
the benefit. However, this can only be done when the benefit 
accrues to the plaintiff's interest that would have been pro-
tected, absent the defendant's negligence. 
In this case, the sterilization had been sought to protect the 
wife's health. The court then narrowly construed this interest 
and stated that U[i]f the failure of the sterilization operation and 
the ensuing pregnancy benefitted the wife's emotional and ner-
vous makeup, and any infirmities in her kidney and bladder or-
gans, the defendants should be able to offset it."·' By narrowly 
construing the scope of the interest to be protected, Custodio 
swiftly disposed of the defendants' benefit argument. The court 
did not construe the wife's general physical and mental health as 
the interest to be protected, which in certain respects may have 
benefitted from the joy, love, and affection of another child. In-
stead, the court narrowed the scope of this interest to the partic-
ular mental and physical areas that the defendants' negligence 
had endangered, namely, the wife's nervous makeup, her kidney 
and bladder. 
64. Id. at 322-23, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 475-76. 
65. For text of § 920, see note 44 supra. 
66. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 323, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476. 
67.Id. 
11
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In Stills v. Gratton,es the second California case, the court 
faced a plaintiff who claimed injury by reason of his illegitimacy. 
His mother, unmarried and pregnant, had employed the defen-
dant to perform an abortion. Though the operation was per-
formed, the child plaintiff was later born healthy.ell Both mother 
and child brought actions for damages alleging negligence by the 
defendant. In upholding the mother's cause of action, the court 
reiterated the Custodio analysis concerning a wrongful birth 
cause of action, including the applicability of Restatement sec-
tion 920.'70 
The court denied the child's cause of action, cited both 
Zepeda v. Zepeda and Williams v. State and noted that the 
child "is a healthy, happy youngster who is a joy to his mother. 
His only damage, if any, caused by the respondents' conduct is 
in being born."'l 
III. REASONING· IN THE PRINCIPLE TWO CASES: 
CURLENDER and TURPIN 
Recently, two districts of the California Court of Appeal 
faced child plaintiff's alleging that had their parents known they 
would give birth to a child with defects they would have chosen 
not to conceive, and, had they conceived, would have aborted. 
The question in both cases was whether a child living with phys-
ical defects could recover in damages for the pain and suffering 
incurred when the only alternative to the child was never to 
have been born at all. 
The court in Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories'71 held 
that an infant born with Tay-Sachs disease stated a cause of ac-
tion for wrongful life against the defendant laboratories which, it 
was alleged, had negligently misinformed the child's parents 
that they would not produce a child aftlicted with Tay-Sachs.'7I 
68. 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976). 
69. Id. at 701·03, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 653·54. 
70. Id. at 708·09, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 658·59 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS, 
§ 920 (1979». 
71. 55 Cal. App. 3d at 705, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 656. The court also cited Gleitman for 
the proposition that in wrongful life cases it is impossible to measure damages. 1d. at 
706, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 656. 
72. 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980). 
73. In Curlender the complaint alleged 88 follows: Phillis and Hyam Curlender, 
plaintiff's parents, on January 15, 1977, retained defendant medical laboratories to ad· 
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One year later, the court in Turpin v. Sortini"4 reviewed all 
prior case law, rejected the Cur lender holding, and instead held 
that the deaf child plaintiff, Joy Turpin, had not stated a cause 
of action. 
A. JUDICIAL AUTHORITY TO DEVELOP TORT LAW 
Since all prior authority had denied the wrongful life cause 
of action, the Turpin court's first volley at the Curlender deci-
sion was aimed at Curlender's right to establish such a cause c:>f 
action. An analysis of this part of both the Curlender and Tur-
pin decisions requires an understanding of the California Su-
preme Court's decision in Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.'7& 
In Rodriguez the Supreme Court faced a situation where sixteen 
years earlier the California Supreme Court, in Deshotel v. Atchi-
son, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railway Co.,'" had flatly denied a 
cause of action for spousal loss of consortium."7 The Rodriguez 
Court stressed that the impediment it faced to recognition of 
such a cause of action was the precedential force of Deshotel.78 
In response, the Rodriguez court found that subsequent to 
minister certain tests. These tests were designed to reveal whether either of the parents 
were carriers of genes which would result in the conception and birth of a child with 
Tay.Sachs disease, medically termed "amaurotic familial idiocy." The tests were given 
on January 21, 1977 and the results allegedly showed that a child conceived of these 
parents would not be afflicted with Tay-Sachs disease. Sometime later Phillis Curlender 
gave birth to a baby girl, plaintiff Shauna Tamar Curlender, and on May 10, 1978, 
Shauna's parents were told that Shauna had Tay·Sachs disease. Id. at 815·16, 165 Cal. 
Rptr. at 480. 
74. 119 Cal. App. 3d 690,174 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1981), rev'd (May 3, 1982) (SF 24319). 
See editor's note at the end of this Note. In Turpin the plaintiff, Joy Turpin, alleged 
that the defendants had diagnosed her elder sister, Hope Turpin, as having normal hear· 
ing. In fact, Hope was totally deaf due to a hereditary hearing defect. Plaintiff's parents, 
James and Joy Turpin, allegedly relied upon these diagnoses and conceived plaintiff. 
Born on August 23, 1977, Joy like her sister Hope, was totally deaf from a hereditary 
abnormality. Id. at 692, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 129. 
75. 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974). In Rodriguez the Califor-
nia Supreme Court was "called upon to decide whether California should continue to 
adhere to the rule that a married person whose spouse has been injured by the negli-
gence of a third party has no cause of action for loss of 'consortium', i.e. for loss of 
conjugal fellowship and sexual relations." Id. at 385, 525 P.2d at 670, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 
766. 
76. 50 Cal. 2d 664, 328 P.2d 449 (1958). 
77. Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d at 387, 525 P.2d at 671,115 Cal. 
Rptr. at 767. 
78. Referring to the trial court, the Supreme Court stated, "Addressing Mary Anne's 
counsel, the court made it clear that it would have ruled in his client's favor but for the 
precedent of Deshotel . ... " Id. 
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the Deshotel decision there had been a dramatic shift in the 
weight of authority. Many state courts and commentators had 
reversed their earlier positions and had recognized the spouse's 
cause of action for loss of consortium.711 On this basis Rodriguez 
held that Deshotel was no longer sound authority and overruled 
it.IO 
Against . this background, the Turpin court criticized 
Curlender for recognizing the child's cause of action since there 
had been no such shift in the weight of authority.ll The question 
arises, however, whether the need for a shift in authority, called 
for in Rodriguez, applies to Curlender. The Rodriguez court 
faced, as its impediment, California Supreme Court precedent 
which had stood for sixteen years. To test the continued validity 
of its own precedent, the court looked to other jurisdictions and 
to the works of legal commentators. The Rodriguez holding ac-
complished a change in California common law and a concomi-
tant overruling of California precedent. For this reason, the 
Court sought support for its holding in the previous shift of atti-
tude in legal circles. 
However, the Curlender court distinguished the facts in its 
case from Stills v. Gratton, II the only previous wrongful life de-
cision in California, and, therefore, did not face any longstand-
ing California precedent. Since the child in Stills was born 
healthy, the only possible injury was his illegitimacy, merely a 
difference in status, and not a physical injury as in Curlender 
and later in Turpin. II Turpin, though, rejected any distinguish-
79. rd. at 388-93, 525 P.2d at 672-75,.115 Cal. Rptr. at 768-71. 
80. rd. at 408, 525 P.2d at 686, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 782. 
81. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 693, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 129. "The reasons for changing these 
principles do not comport with the criteria for changing long-standing rules of law under 
the standards of Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp . ... ; specifically, as will be pointed 
out, there has been no dramatic shift, indeed no shift, in the weight of authority against 
allowing recovery ...... rd. 
82. 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976). 
83. The Curlender court stated: 
"(I)llegitimacy is a status which mayor may not prove to be a 
hinderance to one so born, depending on a multitude of other 
facts; it cannot be disputed that in present society luch a cir-
cumstance, both socially and legally, no longer need present 
an overwhelming obstacle. The same is true for the limply un-
wanted child. We agree with the reasoning of Zepeda and 
Stills that a cause of action based upon impairment of status 
- illegitimacy contrasted with legitimacy - ehould not be 
14
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ing of Stills: 
Curlender concludes that illegitimacy is not an 
injury. It is, however, not a reality that despite so-
cial gains the disadvantage and stigma of being a 
bastard have far from disappeared? [Citation]. It 
is not specious to argue that the burden of illegiti-
macy is a less compensable injury than many 
physical impairments or defects? Though not jus-
tified, may it not in fact be true that an unwanted 
illegitimate child, even more than the cared-for 
although physically handicapped child, is doomed 
to a life of hardship and social stigma?'· 
437 
One might wonder whether these are truly the rhetorical 
questions the Turpin court believed them to be. Furthermore, 
while the California Supreme Court in Rodriguez faced its own 
precedent, which had stood for sixteen years, Curlender, decided 
by an appellate court from the Second District, faced Stills, an 
appellate decision from the First District, which had stood for 
only four years.u Thus, the Rodriguez factors do not stand as an 
impediment to the Curlender decision. Rather, the Curlender 
court was correct when, in framing the question before it, it 
stated, "The appeal presents an issue of first impression in Cali-
fornia .... "88 
Turpin also implied that the mere existence of adverse pre-
cedent in other states stood as a barrier to the Curlender deci-
sion.87 However, Rodriguez had rejected any such idea. It ap-
recognizable at law because a necessary element for the estab-
lishment of any cause of action in tort is missing, injury and 
damages consequential to that injury. A child born with severe 
impairment, however, presents an entirely different situation 
because the necessary element of injury is present." 
106 Cal. App. 3d at 825, 165 Cal. Rptr. 486 (emphasis in original). The dissent in Turpin 
also distinguished Stills: "[TJhe case is dissimilar from the instant case. In Stills the 
child 'was and is a healthy, happy youngster who is a joy to his mother.' His only disabil-
ity was illegitimacy. In view of social mores as they existed in the 1970's, any damages 
would be highly speculative." 119 Cal. App. 3d at 697, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 134 (citation 
omitted). 
84. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 697, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 132. 
85. The independence of the appel1ate districts was i\lustrated when the Turpin 
court, from the Fifth District, refused to fol1ow the Second District's Curlender decision. 
86. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 814, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 479. 
87. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 692, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 129. The Turpin court stated that 
until Curlender, "a long and unbroken line of authority, both in and outside of Califor-
nia, has held that a cause of action for 'wrongful life' could not be stated." rd. 
15
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provingly quoted a Massachusetts court that had observed, "We 
should be mindful of the trend although our decision is not 
reached by a process of following the crowd. "al In this case the 
Curlender court sought to lead the crowd, to show the way to a 
more just tort system; one that other courts had not reached due 
to mixed or muddled reasoning. 
B. DEFERENCE TO THE LEGISLATURE 
The role of the legislature was the second major area where 
Turpin and Cur lender clashed. The Turpin court rejected 
"Curlender as unsound under established principles of law and 
as a sortie into areas of public policy clearly within the compe-
tence of the Legislature."all But Rodriguez had shown that the 
deference-to-the-Iegislature argument had not been persuasive 
when the question involved judicial development of judicially-
created common law: 
The second principal rationale of the Deshotel 
opinion . . . was that any departure from the 
then-settled rule denying the wife recovery for the 
loss of consortium "should be left to the legisla-
tive action," and defendants in the case at bar 
echo that plea. But in the years since Deshotel 
the argument has fared badly in our decisions. 'In 
effect the contention is a request that courts abdi-
cate their responsibility for the upkeep of the 
common law. That upkeep it needs continuously, 
as this case demonstrates.'" 
In this regard, Curlender cited Rodriguez for the proposi-
tion that California courts have power to develop flexible, judi-
cially created tort common law: 
It is to the credit of this state that our highest 
court has, when expansion of tort liability is indi-
88. 12 Cal. 3d at 392, 525 P.2d at 675, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 771. See Diu v. Lilly & Co., 
364 Maaa. 153, 302 N.E.2d 555, 661 (1973). The diaaent in Thrpin atated, "Although 
deference should be accorded decisions of other jurisdictions, they should be followed 
only if consonant with California law." 119 Cal. App. 3d at 698, 174 Cal. Rptr. 133. 
89. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 692-93,174 Cal. Rptr. at 129. The Turpin court argued that, 
"[ilf any decision requires the wise deliberation and painstaking inVestigation that only 
the Legislature can give, the determination that impaired, but living children should be 
enabled to sue for the injury of birth is auch a decision. Accordingly, the iaaue here could 
better be left to legislative determination." [d. at 698, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 133. 
90. 12 Cal. 3d at 393, 525 P.2d at 675-76,115 Cal. Rptr. at 771-72 (quoting People v. 
Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d 879, 882, 395 P.2d 893, 895, 40 Cal. Rptr. 845, 847 (1964». 
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cated, emphasized the flexible nature of judicially 
created common law and the assistance provided 
by analysis of previous decisions whether of Cali-
fornia courts or courts in other jurisdictions in de-
fining the issues, identifying trends and, on occa-
sion, detecting the winds of change.'1 
439 
91. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 827, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 487 (citation omitted). At one point 
the Cur lender court suggested that, in an appropriate case, the child may have a cause of 
action against her parents for wrongful life: 
The "wrongful life" cause of action with which we are con-
cerned is based upon negligently caused failure by someone 
under a duty to do 80 to inform the prospective parents of 
facts needed by them to make a conscious choice not to be-
come parents. If a case arose where, despite due care by the 
medical profession in transmitting the necessary warnings, 
parents made a conscious choice to proceed with a pregnancy, 
with full knowledge that a seriously impaired infant would be 
born, that conscious choice would provide an intervening act 
of proximate cause to preclude liability insofar as defendants 
otller than the parents were concerned. Under such circum-
stances, we see no sound public policy which should protect 
those parents from being answerable for the pain, suffering 
and misery which they have wrought upon their offspring. 
Id. at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488 (emphasis in original). The Turpin Court recoiled from 
this vision of a child suing her parents for the pain and suffering of her genetic defects. 
"The right of parents to make a decision to take the risk of having offspring with a 
defective rather than live childle8B, for example, should not be tampered with by judicial 
intermeddeling." 119 Cal. App. 3d at 697, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 132. 
The Legislature agreed that a child's cause of action for wrongful life should not 
extend to suits against tile parents. As originally introduced by ABBemblyman McAlister, 
A.B. 267 would have totally rejected the Curlender holding: 
A court of appeals has recently held tIlat a child amicted with 
a genetic disorder has a cause of action for damages based on 
. her birth with such defects proximately caused by the negli-
gent failure by a laboratory that conducted genetic tests on 
the child's parents to inform the parents that they were carri-
ers of the genetic disorder. This bill would provide that no 
cause of action arises (1) on behalf of any person based upon 
the claim that the person should not have been conceived or, 
if conceived, should not have been born alive, or (2) on behalf 
of a person based on the claim that another person, once con-
ceived, should not have been allowed to have beem born alive. 
It also would provide that the failure or refusal of a person to 
. prevent the live birtll of another person once conceived shall 
not be a defense in any action against a third party, and would 
prohibit such failure or refusal from being considered in 
awarding damages. 
. . . Section 43.6 is added to the Civil Code, to read: 43.6. 
(a) No cause of action arises on behalf of any person based 
upon the claim that the person should not have been con-
ceived, or if conceived, should not have been born alive. 
17
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In sum, Rodriguez sets forth two guidelines for a court when de-
veloping a new tort rule. First, if there is California precedent, 
look for a dramatic shift of opinion in other jurisdictions. Sec-
ond, if there is no California precedent, look to other jurisdic-
tions to detect the winds of change. 
The Curlender court found no California precedent con-
trary to its holding, but instead detected shifting winds in the 
dissents in cases from other jurisdictions, the views of commen-
tators, the intermediate appellate decisions of Park v. Chessin, 
the implications of Roe v. Wade, the continuing recognition by 
other courts of the parents' cause of action, the retreat from ac-
cepting the "impossibility of measuring damages" as a ground 
for denying the child's cause of action, and the "dramatic in-
crease in the lI;u~t few decades, of the medical knowledge and 
skill needed to avoid genetic disaster. "til 
(b) No cause of action arises on behalf of a person based 
on the claim that another person, once conceived, should not 
have been allowed to have been born alive. 
(c) The failure or refusal of a person to prevent the live 
birth of another person once conceived shall not be a defense 
in any action against a third party, nor shall 8uch failure or 
refUBal be considered in awarding damages in any 8uch action. 
(d) As UBed in this section "conception" means the fertili-
zation of a human ovum by a human sperm." 
A.B. 267, 1981-82 Sess. (Cal. 1981). 
Thia language in the bill ran into opposition in the Assembly Judiciary Committee. 
The amended bill, ultimately paBBed by both the Assembly and Senate and signed by the 
Governor three months after the Turpin deciaion, only rejected any cause of action for 
wrongful life by a child against her parents. Significantly, subsection (b) strengthens the 
child's cause of action against medical personnel. When medical personnel are negligent 
in testing and a child is conceived, but it ia diacovered prior to birth that the child bas 
the feared genetic defects, the medical personnel cannot argue that the parents' refusal 
to obtain an abortion is an intervening act that relieves them of liability. 
A.B. 267, as amended, added § 43.6 to the Civil Code. That section reads: 
(a) No cause of action ariaes against a parent of a child 
based upon the claim that the child should not have been con-
ceived, or, if conceived, should not have been allowed to have 
been born alive. 
(b) The failure or refusal of a parent to prevent the live 
birth of hia or her child shall not be a defense in any action 
against a third party, nor shall the failure or refUBal be consid-
ered in awarding damages in any such action. 
(c) As used in thia section "conceived" means the fertili-
zation of a human ovum by a human sperm. 
1981 Cal. Stat. ch. 331, § 1 (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6 (West Supp. 1981». 
92. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 826, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 486-87. 
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C. V ALUATION OF LIFE 
Though the Curlender court found that it was neither 
bound by decisions from other jurisdictions, nor restrained by 
legislative inaction, it did seek to develop a theory of recovery 
that addressed the main concerns expressed by other courts: 
that a value would have to be assigned to life itself, and that a 
consequent denigration of life would be necessary to find that 
the child was suffering legal damages. Prior courts believed that 
the wrongful life cause of action was tantamount to the idea that 
a genetically-defective child was better off dead, or at least never 
born. 
In response to this concern the Curlender court stated: 
The circumstance that the birth and injury have 
come in hand in hand has caused other courts to 
deal with the problem by barring recovery. The 
reality of the "wrongful life" concept is that such 
a plaintiff both exists and suffers, due to the neg-
ligence of others. It is neither necessary nor just 
to retreat into meditation on the mysteries of life. 
We need not be concerned with the fact that had 
defendants not been negligent, the plaintiff might 
not have come into existence at all. The certainty 
of genetic impairment is no longer a mystery. In 
addition, a reverent appreciation of life compels 
recognition that plaintiff, however impaired she 
may be, has come into existence as a living person 
with certain rights." 
The Turpin court replied that, U[b]y such a narrow, human-
istic approach to an issue laden, as it is, with questions and con-
siderations beyond the judicial ken, Curlender represents at 
least an unwise jurisprudential example which we decline to fol-
low."9. On this point, the Turpin court misperceived Curlender. 
In the above quoted section, the Curlender court recognized that 
the defendant's negligence had produced two distinct elements: 
(1) the child is given life and (2) the child lives with pain and 
suffering.911 Prior decisions had not made this theoretical distinc-
93. ld. at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488. 
94. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 697, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 132. 
95. lOS Cal. App. 3d at 821, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 483. The Curlender court noted that: 
The dissenting opinion in Berman expressed the cogent obser-
vation that, as for the child, "[aJn adequate comprehension of 
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tion between life, and pain and suffering, and neither did Tur-
pin. The significance of this distinction will be shown later. 
The Turpin court, misreading Curlender, searched for the 
basis of Curlender's holding in prior case law and in the Turpin 
child's complaint. In doing so, Turpin interpreted the Curlender 
holding as grounded upon the fundamental right of a child to be 
born as a whole, functional human being." However, Curlender 
explicitly noted both that this fundamental right argument had 
been advanced in the intermediate appellate decision of Park v. 
Chessin97 and that the New York Court of Appeals had rejected 
it.98 Cur lender did not thereafter mention any such right in de-
veloping its analysis, and none was necessary to its holding. Tur-
pin, nonetheless resurrected the old arguments on the rejection 
of any such right, the preciousness of life in any form, and the 
refusal to attach a value to either life or to nonexistence. Again, 
the Turpin court attacked Cur lender for not addressing the 
problem that all previous courts had faced-attaching a value to 
life: "Curlender avoids resolving this fundamental problem of 
measuring damages, that is, comparing the value of impaired life 
against no life."" 
the infant's claims under these circumstances starts with the 
realization that the infant has come into this world and is 
here, encumbered by an injury attributable to the malpractice 
of the doctors." 
Id. (quoting Bennan v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8, 19 (1979) (emphasis in original). 
For a discussion of Berman, see notes 52-56 supra and accompanying text. 
Id. 
96. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 695, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 131. The Turpin court stated: 
Turning to the issue of public policy, it is explicit that the 
minor plaintiff herein predicated her right to recover upon an 
alleged right to be born as a whole, functional human being 
without defect, alleging specifically she was "deprived of the 
fundamental right of a child to be born as a whole, functional 
human being without total deafness, all to her general dam-
ages." Cur lender is implicitly grounded upon the same 
concept. 
97. For a discussion of Park v. Chessin, see notes 33-37 supra and accompanying 
text. 
98. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 822,165 Cal. Rptr. at 484. Referring to the New York Court 
of Appeals, the Curlender court stated, "The court particularly rejected the idea that a 
child may expect life without deformity: 'There is no precedent for recognition at the 
Appellate Division of the fundamental right of a child to be born as a whole, functional 
human being.''' Id. (quoting Becker v. Schwartz, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900, 386 N.E.2d 807, 
812 (1978». 
99. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 695, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 131. 
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While Curlender, did avoid valuing life, it did not shrink 
from measuring damages. As noted earlier, Cur lender made the 
unique distinction between the two simultaneously occuring, but 
theoretically distinct, elements the defendant's negligence had 
produced: the child is given life and the child experiences pain 
and suffering. Therefrom, Cur lender held that the child could 
recover for the detriment received-the pain and suffering-but 
that this injury was only to be measured by the actual life span 
of the child plaintiff, not by any theoretical life span of a child 
without the physical defects.loo In this way, the court again ne-
gated the idea that it based its decision on a fundamental right 
to be born whole. If such a right were being recognized, the cor-
rect measure of damages would have reflected the normal life 
span of a whole child. 
By narrowing the recoverable damages to the pain and suf-
fering of the actual child, the court did not have to value either 
life or nonexistence. What Curlender did not explain was what 
happened to the benefit of life received by the child. If damages 
are assessable for the burden of pain and suffering, for example, 
why shouldn't the benefit of the life received be a component in 
the calculation? After all, this benefit also resulted from the de-
fendant's negligence. In this respect Curlender provides little as-
sistance. It may be that the Curlender court realized that valu-
ing life is a volatile issue, found it unnecessary to its holding, 
100. The Curlender court stated: 
The complaint seeks damages based upon an acturial life ex-
pectancy of plaintiff of more than 70 years-the life expec-
tancy if plaintiff had been bom without the Tay-Sachs dis-
ease. The complaint sets forth that plaintiff's actual life 
expectancy, because of the disease, is only four years. We reo 
ject as untenable the claim that plaintiff is entitled to dam-
ages as if plaintiff has been bom without defects and would 
have had a normal life expectancy. Plaintiff's right to damages 
must be considered on the basis of plaintiff's mental and phys-
ical condition at birth and her expected condition during the 
short life span (four years according to the complaint) antici. 
pated for one with her impaired condition. In similar fashion, 
we reject the notion that a "wrongful-life" cause of action in-
volves any attempted evaluation of a claimed right not to be 
bom. In essence, we construe the "wrongful·life" cause of ac-
tion by the defective child as the right of such child to recover 
damages for the pain and suffering to be endured during the 
limited life span available to such a child and any special pe-
cuniary loss resulting from the impaired condition. 
106 Cal. App. 3d at 830-31, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489 (emphasis in original). 
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and therefore refused to discuss either the value of life or the 
relation of that benefit to the question of damages. Neither 
wanting nor required to make any valuation of life, the court 
ignored the benefit received. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
As shown earlier, Turpin misperceived the Curlender analy-
sis and thereby failed to address Curlender's unique approach. 
Curlender's theoretical distinction between the life received and 
the pain and suffering endured by the child, along with the 
court's assessment of damages, goes far to justify a cause of ac-
tion for the child. However, this analysis was not fully devel-
oped. Since the child is suing only for pain and suffering, not 
life, the question arises whether the defendant can raise the 
value of the benefit received (life) in mitigation of damages. 
Case law provides three ways to deal with the benefit of life in 
wrongful life cases. 
A. INFRINGEMENT ON THE PARENTS' RIGHT To CHOOSE 
As noted earlier,lOl Restatement section 920 applies in Cali-
fornia. According to section 920: 
When the defendant's tortious conduct has 
caused harm to the plaintiff or to his property 
and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to 
the interest of the plaintiff that was harmed, the 
value of the benefit conferred is considered in 
mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is 
equitable. lot 
Thus, section 920 allows the benefit to be raised in mitiga-
tion of damages where it is equitable. In a wrongful life case, it 
would not be equitable to allow the defendant to raise the bene-
fit in mitigation of damages. The defendant never had the inten-
tion of conferring his benefit on the child-plaintiff, but, more 
importantly, the defendant had no right to make such a 
decision. 
In Bushman v. Burns Medical Center,1°' the plaintiff un-
101. The applicability of the Restatement's benefit rule is discussed at notes 65-67 
lIupra and accompanying text. 
102. REsTATEMENT (SBCOND) or TORTS § 90 (1979). 
103. 83 Mich. App. 463. 268 N.W.2d 683 (1978). 
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derwent a vasectomy at the defendant hospital. His wife later 
became pregnant and delivered their fifth child. The parents 
sued the medical center for malpractice, claiming mental and 
emotional suffering and the cost of pregnancy. The trial court 
accepted the defense theory that "any damages incurred by the 
plaintiffs should be offset by the benefits received from having 
the blessing of a healthy child. "104 A verdict for the defense was 
returned. On appeal it was reversed and remanded due to this 
erroneous jury instruction. 
Referring to Restatement section 920, the Bushman court 
stated: 
We believe the last phrase of the quote from the 
Restatement is applicable here. To allow the de-
fense to shield itself behind the love and affection 
of the plaintiffs for their healthy and lovable fifth 
child is less than equitable if indeed the plaintiffs' 
claims are in fact true. That is, that the physician 
was negligent, that the plaintiff mother, a polio 
victim as a child, had considerable and extreme 
difficulty with four previous deliveries, that she 
had a crippling condition of the spine, a signifi-
cant difference in leg length, a distorted pelvis 
and had been subjected to extensive labor any-
where from 45 to 50 hours during delivery. Testi-
mony indicates that plaintiff mother was placed 
under psychiatric care, threatening suicide shortly 
after her pregnancy was confirmed. Under these 
circumstances the damages claimed seem reasona-
bly and equitably severable. 1011 
In a wrongful life case, a jury could not be expected to value 
a child's life at less than the pain and suffering of some genetic 
defects. Furthermore, it is not equitable to allow the benefits 
rule in wrongful life cases because the defendants have infringed 
on the parents' right to choose whether this child should be con-
ceived, or, if conceived, born. An early commentator stated, "[i]f 
the infant is to endure a life with defects, it must be because 
that was the moral choice made by his parents and not because 
they were given no alternative choice due to the negligence or 
104. Id. at 457, 268 N.W.2d at 685. 
105. Id. at 463-64, 268 N.W.2d at 687-88. 
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private morality of a physician. "108 
B. ABSENCE OF BENEFIT TO THE BURDENED INTEREST 
As discussed previously,lO'1 the Custodio court, in applying 
section 920 in California, noted that it applies only when the 
defendant benefits the interest to be protected. In a wrongful 
life case the parents have sought to protect the infant from en-
during the pain and suffering caused by genetic defects. The life 
given to the infant brings all the benefits noted by the courts 
and the child is able to experience many rewards of this earthly 
existence. However, none of these benefits reduces the pain and 
suffering of the infant, although it may receive other benefits. 
The joy and affection lavished on a child by family and friends 
is a rewarding experience. But these benefits cannot reduce 
Shauna Curlender's partial or complete loss of vision, her mental 
underdevelopment, the softness of her muscles, the convulsions, 
or all the pain and suffering attendant thereto. Neither can they 
bring hearing to Joy Turpin. The life given, far from being a 
benefit to these interests to be protected, is the foundation on 
which they rest. The life given supports and nurtures, but does 
not mitigate or reduce, the physical· defects, the very things that 
the parents, in soliciting medical advice from the defendants, 
sought to avoid for their child. 
C. BALANCING OF LIFE AGAINST NONLIFE 
Courts could allow the jury to balance the benefit against 
the burden, rather than making the irrebuttable presumption 
that life is always superior to nonlife. In Sherlock v. Stillwater 
CliniclO8 the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the parents' 
cause of action for "wrongful conception" due to a negligently 
performed sterilization operation, and allowed damages for med-
ical expenses, pain and suffering during delivery, and loss of 
consortium. Also, parents could recover the costs of rearing the 
child, offset by the value of the child's aid, comfort, and society 
during the parent's life expectancy.loe Sherlock allowed the 
value of the child's life in relation to the parents to be used in 
106. Note, A Cause of Action for "Wrongful Life": A SUUeated Analysis, 55 MINN. 
L. REv. 58, 81 (1980). 
107. Custodio u. Bauer is discussed at notes 66-67 lJupra and accompanying text. 
108. 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. S. Ct. 1977). 
109. 1d. at 170-71. 
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mitigation of damages. Likewise, the courts could allow the 
value of the child's life to be applied in mitigation of her own 
damages in a wrongful life case. However, this would entail a 
valuation of life, the very thing that most courts have refused to 
do. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Courts in other jurisdictions have found various reasons to 
deny the child's wrongful life action. Central to all their hold-
ings, however, was the belief that a valuation of life itself was 
necessary to identify the plaintiff's injury and to assess the dam-
ages. This was not the case in Curlender. Curlender recognized 
the child's cause of action without undergoing a valuation of life. 
Turpin misperceived the Curlender court's analysis and thus 
failed to adequately refute its arguments. The Curlender court's 
analysis, including its discussion of damage assessment, coupled 
with the equitable considerations of Restatement section 920, 
provides a solid theoretical foundation for the recognition of a 
child's cause of action for wrongful life when the pain and suf-
fering from genetic defects are made manifest by medical 
malpractice. • 
Daniel Linchey 
• Editor's Note. During publication, the California Supreme Court reversed Tupin 
v. Sortini (May 3, 1982) (No. S.F. 24319). In a 4-2 decision, the court recognized the 
child-plaintifl"s cause of action for wrongful life, but limited recovery to special damages 
such as medical expenses and specialized training. General damages were denied because 
of the inability of comparing the value of an impaired life to nonlife in any fair, non-
speculative manner. The benefit rule of section 920 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts was likewise rejected because it would directly require the weighing of life vs. non-
life. Special damages were allowed since they are certain and readily measurable and in 
many instances the expenses would be vital "not only to the child's well-being but to his 
or her very survival." [d. at 19. 
The dissent found the majority's opinion internally inconsistent in allowing special 
damages but not general damages for the same tort, and would have adopted Curlender's 
approach to awarding general damages. 
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